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ABSTRACT  
This paper focuses on the primary struggle over absolute surplus value strategies in a capitalist 
society. It discusses the relationship between labour and capital, with a specific emphasis on the role 
of class struggle in the case of Greece. It analyses the policies of deunionisation, suppression of 
collective bargaining, deregulation, flexibilisation and social security reforms during the rise of 
neoliberalism from the late 1980s. It states that the high levels of class struggle were unyielding to 
the execution of absolute surplus value strategies in full. The paper argues that the post-2008 
economic crisis further increased the emphasis on these strategies with the intention to implement 
the long-been-postponed labour market reforms under the unique economic and political 
circumstances. Presenting a comparative inquiry into the pre- and post-crisis dynamics of struggle 
over absolute surplus value strategies, the paper indicates that the high levels of class struggle 
generated a barrier to the introduction of recovery policies as an initial response to the crisis. 
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1. Introduction 
The capitalist society is based on capital accumulation, the key actors of which are labour 
and capital as the major agents of the production process. It generates a contradictory 
relationship: the labour selling its labour power and the capital accumulating surplus value 
by exploitation of labour. Hence, the main struggle is over the preservation of rights (in 
terms of working and living conditions) versus the penetration into the production process 
by putting more rigid rules to increase efficiency and productivity.  
Based on this very fundamental characteristic of the capitalist society, this paper focuses on 
the strategies introduced to reach the ultimate aim of increasing the profit. These are 
relative surplus value strategies and absolute surplus value strategies, both of which further 
highlight the antagonistic relationship between labour and capital by their attempts in 
weakening the former and strengthening the latter in the market. To this end, the paper 
briefly defines the relationship between labour, capital and the state with an emphasis on 
class struggle. It also provides a concise analysis on relative and absolute surplus value 
strategies, but focuses on the latter, i.e. labour market reforms, that include measures such 
as increasing the length of the working day, depressing wages per hour and raising the 
intensity of work. It pays particular attention to deunionisation (abolition of trade unions), 
suppression of collective bargaining rights, deregulation of the regulations on work, 
flexibilisation of employment contracts (promotion of atypical forms of work), and 
restriction of social security rights. 
The paper scrutinises the role of class struggle over the absolute surplus value strategies in 
capitalist economies during the rise of neoliberalism. Based on the inquiry of a common 
practice since the early 1970s, it aims to locate Greece among neoliberal capitalist 
economies in terms of the levels of class struggle over absolute surplus value strategies. It 
analyses the processes of deunionisation, suppression of collective bargaining, deregulation, 
flexibilisation and social security reforms in the 1980s and the 1990s with a specific 
emphasis of the role of class struggle. 
 The paper also questions the impact of the post-2008 economic crisis on Greek market in 
terms of labour-capital relations. It offers a brief analysis of the origins of the crisis in 
Greece. It evaluates the initial reform packages and recovery proposals put on the agenda. It 
questions the introduction and execution of absolute surplus value strategies, also revealing 
the importance of class struggle. By doing this, it aims to provide a scrutiny into the first 
years after the crisis with a focus on the reaction of labour unions, the state and the 
international actors. 
 
2. Nature of class relations in capitalist economies 
The essence of the capitalist relations of production lies in the antagonistic relationship 
between labour and capital – the history of capitalist society is the history of class struggle 
(Marx and Engels, 2008: 33). For this very reason, an analytical research on class relations in 
a capitalist society requires a thorough understanding of labour, capital and class struggle in 
the context of a capitalist market economy. It is crucial to comprehend the relations 
between these key agents of the capitalist mode of production.   
The main motive in a capitalist economy is accumulation, driving force of which is ‘to 
develop the productive forces without limit’ (Clarke, 1992: 135). Based on this very central 
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drive in capitalist economy, two major agents of production process, namely labour and 
capital, are also subject to an essential exchange relation: labour selling its labour power 
and capital buying labour power as a commodity in the market. Hence, there exists a 
tension that is inherent to the capitalist accumulation process: labour’s struggle to improve 
its working and living conditions and capital’s effort to raise its profits by reducing the cost 
of labour power. 
In this extremely tense relationship, labour aims to safeguard its interests and rights by 
organised resistance against the intensification of exploitation. On the other hand, the main 
concern of capital ‘is the difference between the price of labour power and the value which 
its function creates’ (Marx, 1982: 682). Value preserves itself ‘precisely only by constantly 
driving beyond its quantitative barrier’ (Marx, 1973: 270), and hence, an unremitting 
increase in the rate of profit turns out to be crucial. Capitalist mode of production brings 
together a pressure of market competition, and this motivates individual capitalists’ desire 
to ‘receive as much labour as possible for as little money as possible’ (Marx, 1982: 682).  
In its attack on labour, capital concurrently undertakes strategies aiming to increase the rate 
of profit. These are relative surplus value strategies that incorporate improving the 
machinery, enhancing the skills of workers, introducing technological innovations, and 
absolute surplus value strategies that include increasing the length of the working day, 
depressing wages per hour and raising the intensity of work (by ‘reducing the porosity of the 
work process’ or ‘increasing the speed at which the worker performs a given task’) (Gough, 
2003: 50). Implementation of these strategies ‘increase[s] the value produced per hour, that 
is, labour productivity’ (Gough, 2003: 50).  
It is also important to clarify the position of the state in this relationship. The capitalist state 
is ‘a part of [this] antagonistic and crisis-ridden development of capitalist society’ (Holloway, 
1996: 121). It secures the rights of private property by safeguarding ‘equal exchange 
relations between the sellers and buyers of labour power’ (Bonefeld, 2000: 60). In other 
words, it guarantees ‘the bourgeois relations of exploitation’ in the labour market 
(Bonefeld, 2000: 60). Therefore, the state is subordinated to ‘the reproduction of capital, 
which determines the state as a moment of that reproduction’ (Clarke, 1991: 195). The class 
character of the state is the essential feature of the reproduction of social relations (Clarke, 
1991), which, in turn, is crucial for the existence of the state (Bonefeld, 2000: 60). The 
capitalist state is ‘a moment of the class struggle’ (Clarke, 1991: 195). 
Another key element of the conflict between labour and capital is public expenditure with 
its very direct influence on class relation of distribution. The class struggle affects the ratio 
of public expenditure, which is composed of government employment, benefits and tax of 
the working class. Relative and absolute surplus value strategies are accompanied by a 
reduction of public services and transfer payments, employment benefits in the public 
sector and increase of the tax burden. This significantly increases the bargaining power of 
capital over labour in the market. Labour market, in this regard, is only ostensibly free and 
equal.  
Within its limited space, this paper sets aside an analysis of the relative surplus value 
strategies and rather focuses on absolute surplus value strategies. It stresses how absolute 
surplus value strategies ‘involve changes in control, tasks, or the employment relation’ 
(Gough, 2003: 50), i.e., labour market reforms. It also evaluates changes in the ratio of 
public expenditure as a mechanism of reducing the bargaining power of labour by 
disciplinary mechanisms with reference to class relations. The next section, therefore, is 
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allocated to an inquiry into the political economy of absolute surplus value strategies and 
public expenditure. 
 
3. Rise of neoliberalism in capitalist economies: A struggle over 
absolute surplus value strategies 
World capitalism experienced an economic breakdown in the early 1970s, based on the 
contradictions inherent to the capitalist mode of production: mainly the tendency for the 
rate of profit to fall (Bullock and Yaffe, 1988; Savran, 1988; Wright, 1988) and the 
overaccumulation of capital (Bonefeld, Brown and Burnham, 1995; Clarke, 2001) among a 
diversity of Marxist theories of crisis.2   
This revealed the need for a paradigmatic shift in the economic policy and the labour 
regime. Capital reacted to the crisis of profitability with neoliberalism, a ‘wide range of 
social, political and economic phenomena at different levels of complexity’ (Saad-Filho and 
Johnston, 2005: 1). Neoliberal economic and political practices targeted to alter the class 
relations and increase the rate of profit. This enhanced the ‘antagonistic character of 
capitalist accumulation’ (Marx, 1982: 799) so that the conflict between labour and capital 
became more explicit. The contradictions inherent to the capitalist mode of production 
deepened the attempt of capital to emancipate itself from labour vis-à-vis its inclination 
towards the financial market. It fled the factory and ‘started to accumulate wealth in the 
money form without a corresponding exploitation of labour power in the factory’ (Bonefeld 
and Holloway, 1996: 212).   
The expansion of the financial market and the enhanced sectoral and spatial mobility of 
money concurrently occurred with the increasing mobility of commodity and the productive 
capital. The crisis intensified the competition among individual capitals, and this made 
devalorisation of capital inevitable as ‘the condition for profitable accumulation’ (Gough, 
2003: 232). Internationalisation of production also engendered a challenge for individual 
capitals and national states – offering higher rates of profit and attracting foreign capital 
investment turned into a necessity. 
The ability of capital to make profits in the financial market and the increase in international 
competitiveness in the productive market reinforced the implementation of absolute 
surplus value strategies, which functioned to overturn the power relations institutionalised 
between the labour and capital during the Keynesian economic policy.3 The prevailing 
monetarist economic policy of the post-1970s intensified the emphasis on efficiency and 
competitiveness by certain strategies. This was how the world market encountered the 
post-2008 economic crisis. 
The key impulse of the capital was to achieve higher rates of profit in the productive market 
by disciplining labour through absolute surplus value strategies, i.e. labour market reforms. 
These included increasing the competitiveness of both individual capitals and national states 
in the world market. Hence, the conflict between labour and capital further intensified in 
                                                     
2
 For further discussions, see Sarımehmet Duman (2014a) “A theoretical framework for the analysis of the 
current global economic crisis: The financial market and the real economy”, The Economic and Labour 
Relations Review, 25(2): 240-252. 
3 For further discussions, see Sarımehmet Duman (2014b) The Political Economy of Labour Market Reforms: 
Greece, Turkey and the Global Economic Crisis, London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
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the neoliberal era due to the implementation of absolute surplus value strategies with a 
motive to increase productivity and competitiveness. The neoliberal strategy endeavoured 
to defeat labour in all areas by comprehensive reforms. It disciplined labour to subordinate 
the new labour regime under the conditions of high unemployment rates and strong 
competition for jobs. The new labour regime aimed to re-regulate the length of the working 
day, wages per hour and intensity of work. It highlighted deunionisation, suppression of 
collective bargaining rights (decentralise wage bargaining processes), deregulation of work, 
flexibilisation of employment contracts (promotion of atypical forms of work), and 
restriction of social security and pension rights. These policies targeted inactivation of trade 
unions in the workplace in order to omit obstacles to weaken the bargaining power of 
labour on their living and working conditions.  
The main motive in the capitalist mode of production, i.e. accumulation, unveiled the 
magnitude of absolute surplus value strategies in increasing the rate of profit. 
Deunionisation aimed to facilitate the implementation of all other labour market reforms, 
depriving labour of power to show resistance against labour market reforms. Trade unions 
were either outlawed or turned into organisations that contain labour ‘within limits 
compatible with profits’ (Cleaver, 1996: 163). Suppression of collective bargaining rights – 
that also dismantle wage protection policies, and restriction of social security rights made a 
significant impact on depressing wages per hour.  
Deregulation and flexibilisation policies functioned as the most comprehensive absolute 
surplus value strategies – they had an impact on the length of the working day, wages per 
hour and intensity of work. As part and parcel of the removal of regulations on the labour 
market, institutionalisation of deregulated forms of work fragmented some production into 
small enterprises, which, in turn, decreased the organisational capacity of labour. 
Flexibilisation of employment contracts (contracting out, part-time work, temporary work, 
telework) promoted atypical forms of work, and provided capital with more room for 
manoeuvre in hire and fire, assigning informal tasks to workers, and wages. These policies 
institutionalised the employment of unregistered workers in arduous and unhealthy 
occupations with maximum working hours, which degraded the resistance of labour in both 
formal and informal sectors (Muftuoglu, 2006: 133). Contracting out of public services 
dispersed welfare provisions in the market (Bonefeld, 1996: 54; Bonefeld and Holloway, 
1996: 218).  
Social security and pension reforms also constituted an important part of absolute surplus 
value strategies by increasing the age of retirement, decreasing the pension benefits and re-
regulating the health sector coverage by supporting private initiatives. These policies 
diminished the living conditions of labour, and also functioned as disciplinary mechanisms 
deteriorating their potential to show resistance against such reform attempts. In this 
respect, all of these strategies constituted the particular aim of increasing the profitability 
and competitiveness of the capitalist market economy. The scope of labour market reform 
processes, on the other hand, was shaped by the organisational capacity of labour and the 
intensity of class struggle. 
Public expenditure policies also performed to bring novelty in state’s budgetary strategies 
towards the public, and hence, discipline labour under neoliberalism. These limited public 
services, transfer payments and employment benefits, intending to lower the rate of debt to 
gross domestic product (GDP) and restrict the resistance of labour by developing an 
environment of low income, poverty and high unemployment. These policies contained 
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labour within austerity and poverty, and impelled private indebtedness – which, in turn, 
facilitated the implementation of absolute surplus value strategies. Credit-based private 
consumption, socialisation of debt through ‘fiscal reforms, rescue of banks, [and] the use of 
public expenditure as a means of imposing the discipline of poverty’ institutionalised the 
redistribution of state revenues as a reflection of class relations (Bonefeld, 1996: 38).  
 
4. Locating Greece among neoliberal capitalist economies: Absolute 
surplus value strategies under the shadow of class struggle 
Greece generated a distinctive case among neoliberal capitalist economies in terms of the 
transition from the Keynesian to monetarist economic policy and the execution of absolute 
surplus value strategies. The high levels of class struggle due to well-organised labour under 
trade unions and political party organisations constituted a barrier to the implementation of 
labour market reforms in full.4 General strike functioned as the mainstream trade union 
resistance activity to structural labour market reforms (Kretsos and Vogiatzoglou, 2015: 
223). A comparison of absolute surplus value strategies under the influence of the class 
struggle before and after the economic crisis present a testimony to the impact of organised 
labour on class relations, industrial policies and labour market structures.  
 
4.1 Transition to neoliberalism before the economic crisis 
Neoliberalism that has dominated capitalist economies from the early 1970s has started to 
take Greece under its influence from the late 1980s onwards. Absolute surplus value 
strategies were put on the agenda in the late 1980s and accelerated in the 1990s, despite 
significant flows in their implementation due to high levels of class struggle. Various 
governments under the rule of New Democracy (ND) and PanHellenic Socialist Movement 
(PASOK) demonstrated their dedication to execute the required reforms for a successful 
transition to a neoliberal setting.5  
The EU also played a pivotal role in framing the necessity to implement these strategies by 
defining economic thresholds for the member states. This frame provided a legitimacy 
ground for the introduction of labour market reforms by relevant governments.6 To tackle 
with the high levels of class struggle and organised resistance of labour, the introduction of 
European Social Dialogue was instrumentalised to create an illusion of harmony among 
trade union organisations and the state.7 However, the conflict between labour and capital 
became even more evident during labour market reform processes. The class struggle was 
intensified, and the 1990s witnessed intense struggle over absolute surplus value strategies 
in the case of Greece.  
The initial policies put on the agenda to limit the intensity of class struggle were 
deunionisation and suppression of collective bargaining rights. Reform attempts aimed to 
                                                     
4 Sarimehmet Duman (2014b), pp. 206-212. 
5 
For a detailed analysis of labour market reforms in the 1980s and onwards, see Sarımehmet Duman (2014b). 
6 A detailed analysis of the impact of the EU on the rise and consolidation of neoliberal principles in the 
member states is available in Sarımehmet Duman (2014c) “The rise and consolidation of neoliberalism in the 
European Union: A comparative analysis of social and employment policies in Greece and Turkey”, European 
Journal of Industrial Relations, 20(4): 367-382. 
7
 A Confidence Pact was signed between GSEE, ADEDY, SEV and the government in 1997. 
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turn trade unions into interest groups with no political lineage to labour or a political party. 
Moreover, these policies intended to fragment labour into different interest groups by 
degrading its organisational capacity. There were also several endeavours to decentralise 
wage bargaining processes. However, labour resistance continued to be quite high during 
this first stage of transition to neoliberalism with the number of strikes being very high 
throughout the 1980s and the 1990s (Ioannou, 1999). For this reason, restrictions on the 
organisational rights of labour were rather limited. Greece remained as a unique case in that 
collective bargaining processes continued to piece labour together with nationwide general 
strikes for improvements in the working and living conditions (EIROnline, 1998).  
Greek labour market witnessed trials for deregulation of work and flexibilisation of 
employment contracts (by institutionalisation of atypical forms of work such as part-time 
work, temporary work, telework, contracting out and informal work) from the 1990s 
onwards – initially in the private sector and then in the public sector. Deregulation of work 
and flexibilisation of employment contracts, which aimed to boost the rate of profit by 
increasing the length of the working day, decreasing wages per hour and raising the 
intensity of work, gained an institutional status with the Agreement on Social Policy signed 
between the European Social Partners8 in 1991.  
Deregulation and flexibilisation policies accelerated in the early 2000s with the 
announcement of a neoliberal reform programme. The first strategy employed to increase 
the rate of profit in the private sector was to deregulate the length of working day, which 
would in turn contribute to cutting the cost of labour power. The private sector trade union 
confederation, General Confederation of Greek Workers (GSEE), called for a 24-hour strike, 
but a law on the length of the working day was adopted in 2000 (EIROnline, 2000). This was 
followed by another law on the institutionalisation of part-time and temporary contracts in 
the public sector. The public sector trade union confederation, Civil Servants’ Association 
(ADEDY), protested with a 24-hour general strike (EIROnline, 2003). Despite all the class 
struggle, these laws on deregulation of work in the private sector and flexibilisation of 
employment contracts in the public sector were legislated in Greece. 
It is important to highlight that there were certain cases GSEE and ADEDY could collaborate 
to strengthen their resistance against deregulation and flexibilisation policies. They 
underlined the significance of the unity of labour against the neoliberal strategy by 
employing general strike as an efficient instrument of resistance. All Workers Militant Front 
(PAME), trade union organisation of the Communist Party of Greece (KKE), also played a 
very strategic role of representing class struggle in Greece. PAME operated in affiliation with 
KKE in its struggle against the neoliberal programme. There were also many cases GSEE, 
ADEDY and PAME collaborated in general strikes9 or a general strike declared by GSEE and 
ADEDY was supported by PAME to show resistance against certain reform attempts.10 
The social security and pension reforms also played a great role as an absolute surplus value 
strategy under the pressure for concerns over public spending (Matsaganis, 2007: 545). It 
                                                     
8
 European Social Partners refers to the organisations engaged in the European social dialogue at the EU level. 
It incorporates Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederations of Europe (UNICE), European Centre of 
Employers and Enterprises providing Public Services (CEEP), labour unions, and the European Trade Union 
Confederation (ETUC) (Eurofound, 2007). 
9 The 24-hour strike in October 2008 against flexibilisation and deregulation in the labour market is a good 
example to this.  
10 The key demands were pay rises and improvements in areas such as family and maternity allowances, 
conditions for workers in unhealthy and arduous jobs, and staff promotions. 
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aimed to decrease the cost of labour power by regulations on social insurance and pension 
funds. GSEE and ADEDY protested the first reform package drafted in 2001 with a 24-hour 
strike, rate of participation to which reached at 100% in some sectors (EIROnline, 2001). 
Nonetheless, the law was adopted with relatively limited changes in 2002 (Zambarloukou, 
2004: 12). The social security and pension reform was put on the agenda again in 2007 to 
introduce wider regulations on increase in the retirement age, change in the method of 
pension calculations, unification of insurance funds, limitation of the list of arduous and 
unhealthy occupations and incentives to remain in the labour market (EIROnline, 2007). 
GSEE and ADEDY strongly opposed to the proposals with a 24-hour general strike that 
reached at the highest rate of participation in Greek history. They emphasised that the 
reform package aims to ‘free up public and social resources in favour of the economy and 
making profits’ (EIROnline, 2007). Interestingly, Hellenic Federation of Enterprises (SEV) also 
supported these protest movements (EIROnline, 2008b), but the reform package was 
passed in 2007, depriving labour of significant rights. 
Trade union opposition to pension reform remained unyielding in the pre-crisis era 
(Matsaganis, 2007: 549). Intensive class struggle against the social security and pension 
reforms and SEV’s support to GSEE and ADEDY in order to end protest movements and 
strikes symbolised the retreat of capital. Being economically damaged by the strikes, the 
capitalist class was ready to put away the reform package that it had attached utmost 
importance (EIROnline, 2008a). On the other hand, the state’s dedication to implement 
these absolute surplus value strategies was iconic to indicate its commitment to 
neoliberalism. This incident also indicated that the capitalist state has the potential to be 
more militant than individual capitals, and this could be interpreted as ‘advancement in the 
class character of the state’ (Boratav, 2005: 95). The capitalist state could sacrifice short-
term interests of individual capitals for the long-term interest of capital.  
When compared to deregulation and flexibilisation policies, it would be plausible to argue 
that social security and pension reforms attracted an important degree of labour resistance 
primarily due to their extensive scope. This reform proposal influenced all segments of the 
society – including the youth (who will be in the labour market in the future), the workers 
(who are actively in the labour market) and pensioners (who had been in the labour 
market). The wide scope of social security and pension reforms motivated GSEE, ADEDY and 
PAME to organise extensive resistance movements. Collaboration among trade union 
confederations peaked during the social security system reform in the first decade of the 
2000s.  
In this political and economic setting of Greece, organised labour movements constituted a 
significant obstacle to the implementation of the labour market reforms in full. There was a 
dialectical relationship between timing, scope and effect of reform proposals and labour 
movement. Resistance was limited when the proposals were narrow in scope and effect, 
whereas the scope and effect of proposals were considerably circumvented when the 
resistance of labour was extensive.11 The reaction of labour to different reform packages 
was, therefore, contingent. 
Intensive class struggle in Greece attained numerous gains in relative terms, and more 
importantly, prevented the complete fulfilment of absolute surplus value strategies and 
consolidation of neoliberal relations. The resistance against deregulation of work and 
flexibilisation of employment contracts restricted and/or postponed reform packages. The 
                                                     
11 Sarımehmet Duman (2014b), pp. 107-176 and pp. 206-212. 
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rate of part-time employment to total employment only slightly increased from 6% in 2000 
to 8% in 2010 (European Commission, 2006-7). Labour suffered from serious setbacks in 
social security, but the scope of reforms remained rather limited. Despite these reforms, 
expenditure on social protection as a percentage of GDP increased from 20.8% in 1997 to 
24.3% in 2001 and to 24.4% in 2007 (European Commission, 2011: 289).   
There were also some initiatives to bring changes in the public expenditure, which was 
perceived as an instrument to discipline labour. The 1985 Stabilisation Programme agreed 
to limit public expenditure (Pagoulatos, 2000: 194–196). The annual rate of real growth in 
public expenditure was decreased from 10% in 1980-1985 to 1% in 1985-1990 (Close, 2002: 
157). However, in spite of many reforms and attempts to budgetary regulations, public 
expenditure increased from 45.3% of GDP in 2001 to 53.8% of GDP in 2009 (European 
Commission, 2011: 69).  
To sum up, there occurred a significant level of struggle over the implementation of 
absolute surplus value strategies in Greece from the late 1980s. Greek labour faced many 
serious attacks on labour rights in forms of deunionisation, suppression of collective 
bargaining, deregulation, flexibilisation and social security. The well-organised trade union 
organisations in public and private sectors responded many of these attacks by intensive 
class struggle via general strike. Hence, labour market reforms remained significantly limited 
in their scope. This positioned Greece as a divergent economy within the Eurozone in terms 
of its level of competitiveness (Sarımehmet Duman, 2018). Being diverged from thoroughly 
functioning capitalist market economies, Greek economy was described with its high unit 
labour costs and continuous loss of competitiveness (Monastiriotis, 2011: 50-51). Under 
these conditions, the impact of the post-2008 economic crisis became more challenging for 
Greece. The next section is allocated to the evaluation of the strong persistence to 
implement absolute surplus value strategies in the post-crisis Greece and the initial 
response of labour. 
 
4.2 Initial response to the economic crisis: 2008–2011 
Greece had generally been considered as a close economy due to its ‘low openness’ to the 
global market. Despite that, it experienced ‘an unprecedented fiscal and sovereign debt 
crisis’ by the end of 2009 (Monastiriotis, 2011: 45). The primary reason behind this fiscal 
shock was the proportion of government debt to GDP. It had earlier been officially reported 
as 3.7%, however, it was re-calculated as 5.4% in October 2009, 10.6% in November 2009, 
12.7% in December 2009 and 13.6% in April 2010 (Monastiriotis, 2011: 50; Featherstone, 
2011: 199).12 Announcement of ‘a tripling of the level of government debt’ (Featherstone, 
2011: 199) was followed by ‘a complete collapse of confidence’ in Greek market 
(Christodoulakis, 2010: 89), which eventually put ‘additional pressures on the government 
debt and the budget deficit’ (Monastiriotis, 2011: 50). 
Within this scene, it is also crucial to underline that the level of financialisation was quite 
low in Greece. The Greek real estate did not experience a recession similar to the one 
encountered in the financially liberalised and integrated economies during the post-2008 
economic crisis. Banking sector was comparatively simple. It did not ‘involve work with the 
                                                     
12
 Government debt increased every year by 7 to 12 billion Euros in 2002-2007, the Olympic year of 2004 being 
an exception by 16 billion Euros (Christodoulakis, 2010: 89). However, in 2008 and 2009, government debt 
increased to a total of 56 billion Euros in Greece (Christodoulakis, 2010: 90). 
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more speculative side of modern international banking’, ‘loan levels [remained] low’ and the 
mortgage market was ‘only beginning to develop in a modern form’ (Pettifer, 2010: 1). In 
this respect, the world recession and the collapse of confidence in Greek market only 
triggered the economic crisis in Greece. 
The post-2008 economic crisis in Greece was, therefore, not a consequence of excessive 
financialisation (Sarımehmet Duman, 2018). On the contrary, it was a consequence of the 
Greek sovereign debt, which was based on the ‘serious and long-term structural factors in 
the economy’ (Pettifer, 2010: 2). Government debt was increased by the continuous loss of 
competitiveness in the Eurozone (Monastiriotis, 2011: 49) and continuous rise of unit labour 
costs (OECD, 2012), both of which were a consequence of the failure to pursue absolute 
surplus value strategies in the earlier decades. That is to say, the crisis had its roots in the 
productive sector.  
This finding was also evidenced by the fact that the first measures considered to rescue the 
economy after the crisis were absolute surplus value strategies. The economic crisis 
generated a legitimate excuse for the implementation of long-been-postponed labour 
market reforms. The first action taken to tackle the economic crisis was the 28-billion Euros 
rescue plan announced in October 2008. At the emergency meeting with EU leaders in 
March 2009, it was argued that the budget deficit should be decreased below 3% of the 
gross national product (GNP) and the taxation system should be changed to combat one of 
the main structural problems of Greek economy, tax evasion. The key to decreasing the 
budget deficit was reducing social benefits, services and public investment, and raising tax 
revenues. In line with this, reform policies started with budgetary regulations including 
closing the gap between public expenditure and public revenues. These policies decreased 
the rate of total general public expenditure to GDP from 53.8% in 2009 to 50.2% in 2010 
(European Commission, 2011: 69). There were also some regulations on the tax policy that 
the tax exemption for the first 9,500 Euros of income was abolished, and the taxes paid by 
workers were increased. Tax rates on production and imports to GDP decreased from 12.4% 
in 2008 to 12.0% in 2010 (European Commission, 2011: 71).  
These initial measures significantly deteriorated the working and living conditions of labour, 
which increased the intensity of class struggle. GSEE and ADEDY organised a 24-hour strike 
to protest against the rescue plan (GSEE, 2008). KKE and PAME also called for a strike with 
an emphasis on the antagonistic nature of the capitalist mode of production. These 
resistance movements were responded by the release of a 900-million Euros economic 
package including financial support to pensioners and unemployed (Kathimerini, 2008). 
Nonetheless, these superficial measures could not suffice to contain class struggle in the 
following years.  
Economic indicators got even worse in March 2010: ‘the budgetary deficit amounted 12.7% 
of GDP (30 billion Euros); the debt of the central government exceeded 120% of GDP while 
the debt of the general government exceeded 113% of GDP; annual expenditure on interest 
has exceeded 12 billion Euros; and the primary regular budget expenditure increased during 
the last three years by 50% (20 billion Euros)’ (EIROnline, 2010). Deterioration in the 
economy brought further cuts on public spending, including reduction in spending on 
contract workers, ban on hiring permanent and temporary staff and freeze in wage 
increases (Kathimerini, 2009a; Papathanassiou, 2009). Additionally, several comprehensive 
absolute surplus value strategies were put on the agenda for economic recovery. To put it 
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plainly, the neoliberal attack gained pace with further decrease in the public expenditure 
and increase in the flexibility of the labour market in post-crisis Greece. 
As these strategies mainly targeted the public sector, ADEDY took the lead in the 
organisation of labour resistance.  Two general strikes were held in May and June 2009 to 
resist the policy proposals such as flexibilisation of work, cut on wages, and privatisations. 
ADEDY highlighted their claim for social justice, employment under full-time contracts and a 
just taxation system (2009). These protest movements also had a historical significance by 
unifying workers from the public sector and the private sector for a common cause. GSEE 
and ADEDY held a 24-hour general strike to protest the economic recovery actions including 
budget cuts, flexibilisations in the labour market and restrictions on social security rights. 
This action presented a highly political resistance against the post-crisis policies by revealing 
the cooperation between the national and international powers in the management of the 
crisis (ADEDY, 2009). It aimed to underline that the workers are not to shoulder the burden 
of the crisis (Apoyevmatini, 2009).  
The role of international actors increased by their involvement in the recovery process by 
the agreement on economic adjustment programmes. Following the First Economic 
Adjustment Programme in 2010, a 110 billion Euros rescue package released by the EU and 
the IMF (30 billion Euros from the IMF and 80 billion Euros from the EU). The troika 
(composed of the EU, the ECB and the IMF) presented the implementation of austerity 
measures and absolute surplus value strategies as a prerequisite for the release of the next 
instalments of the bailout. The Memorandum of Understanding included a three-year 
programme for ‘macroeconomic adjustment and structural reform’ by ‘restor[ing] fiscal 
sustainability and bring[ing] the public debt under control, improv[ing] the outward 
orientation and competitiveness of the economy, and safeguard[ing] the financial sector 
while protecting the most vulnerable population groups’ (Calamitsis, 2011). The reform 
agenda also included freeze and homogenisation of wages in the public sector, opening of 
the ‘closed’ occupations, liberalisation of the energy market, and privatisation of state-
owned enterprises (Eleftheros Tipos, 2010).  
The first auditing was completed in June 2010. The troika agreed to release the second 
instalment of the bailout in September 2010 with the precondition that the reform 
strategies agreed in the Memorandum of Understanding would be fully implemented. The 
IMF also approved the disbursement of 3.2 billion Euros loan tranche (a part of the 110 
billion Euros bailout package) in July 2011. It asserted that the significant policy challenges 
such as durable fiscal adjustment, privatisations and, most importantly, productivity-
enhancing reforms like reducing administrative barriers to investment were expected to be 
completed (Kathimerini, 2011e). The European Commission also set up a task force to 
closely monitor the reform process in Greece (Kathimerini, 2011f).  
This neoliberal attack advised by the troika and administered by the state attracted a great 
deal of labour resistance following the introduction of these reform strategies in post-crisis 
Greece. Despite the fact that Greece was ‘not the only country to experience acute 
economic problems and … to adopt austerity policies’ (among Spain, Italy, Portugal and 
Ireland), ‘anti-austerity protests were much more intense in Greece than elsewhere, 
including in comparison to countries that have also had to resort to international financial 
rescues’ (Rüdig, and Karyotis, 2014: 488). The number of general strikes reached up to 7 in 
2010. In 2011, ADEDY and GSEE organised nationwide general strikes and rallies to protest 
‘the government's ongoing austerity drive’, ‘cuts to wages and benefits’ (Kathimerini, 
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2011a), the approval of new austerity measures (Kathimerini, 2011c; Kathimerini, 2011d), 
‘further tax hikes and public spending cuts’ (Kathimerini, 2011b) and ‘plans to put thousands 
of public functionaries into a labour reserve pool on a heavily docked salary and to push 
thousands of others into early retirement’ (Kathimerini, 2011g). KKE and PAME also played 
an active role in the organisation of strikes and rallies with an increased emphasis on the 
importance of conducting EU-sceptic politics.  
There were also many sector-based strikes in both public sector and private sector with the 
involvement of transport workers, doctors, pharmacists, teachers, garbage collectors, media 
workers, Hellenic Petroleum workers, municipal workers, local authority workers, state 
audit council workers, sailors, air traffic controllers and nurses who got organised under 
trade unions and professional chambers of various occupations. Lawyers and taxi drivers 
joined the protestors to secure their closed occupations against being opened to 
competition. The initial response of labour to these economic recovery policies mainly 
including absolute surplus value strategies in Greece signified the importance of 
collaboration among sectors as well as trade unions with different political views. In this 
tense political and economic atmosphere, provisions of several reform packages were 
limited or amended to contain labour resistance. Intensive class struggle prevented the 
implementation of a significant number of agreed reform strategies. 
Economic recovery policies and absolute surplus value strategies in post-crisis Greece were 
highly influenced by the involvement of international actors in the process. The EU and the 
IMF highlighted the importance of the execution of austerity policies in the release of their 
financial support. This international collaboration provided the state with the necessary 
political instruments to present the reform packages and more structural initiatives such as 
labour market reforms as economic imperatives put as preconditions for the release of 
further funds. This offered a unique opportunity to legitimise the absolute surplus value 
strategies that the most conflicting one of these regulations, social security reform, was 
adopted in July 2010.  
A brief analysis of the first years after the emergence of the economic crisis indicates that 
the initial response to the economic crisis was quite aggressive in terms of the insistence on 
introducing comprehensive absolute surplus value strategies. In this political and economic 
setting, the already strong class struggle in Greece gained further strength to resist the 
execution of structural labour market reforms. Strikes and protest movements became 
‘more passionate and frequent’, enlarging the ‘playing field of union and social movement 
praxis to unprecedented levels’ (Kretsos and Vogiatzoglou, 2015: 226). The level of labour 
resistance peaked following the agreement with the troika on an extensive reform agenda. 
Trade union organisations interrupted the attempts of the Greek state and its international 
collaborators from making significant structural changes in the Greek labour market. A 
short-term resolution to this political turmoil was the introduction of an EU-led technocratic 
government under the Prime Minister Papademos, a former European Central Bank Official, 
in November 2011. This strategic move aimed to facilitate the execution of absolute surplus 
value strategies and the austerity measures prescribed at these initial stages of the 
economic crisis.  
The neoliberal attack on Greek labour continued with diverse strategies in the next years. 
The extent and intensity of labour resistance constituted an obstacle to the implementation 
of comprehensive absolute surplus strategies in full. However, the Second Economic 
Adjustment Programme agreed in 2012 and the Third Economic Adjustment Programme 
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agreed in 2015 included longer lists of reform policies. Labour movement remained 
comparatively less active due to a number of domestic and international factors. Under 
these circumstances, trade union organisations failed to ‘impede the reduction of wage 
earners’ income’ and to ‘confirm their leading role in mobilizing the working population’ 
(Kretsos and Vogiatzoglou, 2015: 217). Moreover, the rule of the ‘so-called’ left-wing 
government under the Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA) made a significant impact on 
the containment of labour, which showed less reaction to active implementation of 
absolute surplus value strategies. Almost one year after the exit of Greece from the bailout 
programme, the losses of Greek labour in terms of their rights and working conditions 
deserve a thorough scrutiny.  
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper analysed the class relations in the capitalist society with as focus on the concepts 
of labour, capital, class struggle and the state in the transition to neoliberalism. It 
highlighted the importance of absolute surplus value strategies in weakening labour in 
terms of its working and living conditions while strengthening capital in the production 
process. It pointed out how absolute surplus value strategies aim to increase the rate of 
profit in capitalist market economies. Hence, it also highlighted how these strategies 
become the centre of class struggle.  
Within this framework, the paper aimed to locate Greece among other capitalist economies 
in its transition to neoliberalism since the late 1980s. Under the influence of intensive class 
struggle, Greece became an extraordinary case that many of the absolute surplus value 
strategies introduced in the 1980s and the 1990s turned unsuccessful. This indicated that 
well-organised and active labour unions were capable of making a significant impact on the 
struggle over absolute surplus value strategies. Greece remained as one of the least 
competitive economies of Europe with considerably better working conditions for labour.  
The paper highlighted that Greece faced the post-2008 economic crisis under these unique 
economic conditions. In this setting, absolute surplus value strategies were put on top of the 
agenda with an intention to introduce structural changes to the Greek labour market. Troika 
presented the neoliberal reform agenda as a necessity for a successful recovery. This 
offered the state a distinctive opportunity to implement the long-been-postponed labour 
market reforms by presenting structural measures as economic imperatives. Class struggle 
was restrained by the promotion of austerity measures as an international obligation under 
the economic and political pressure of the troika. This international setting in the 
management of crisis in Greece facilitated the implementation of absolute surplus value 
strategies as an initial after-crisis policy by degrading them to merely technical phenomena.  
The paper stated that these initial strategies further revealed the inherent contradictions of 
capitalism by peaking class struggle during the first years of the economic crisis. As an initial 
response to the crisis, labour raised awareness against absolute surplus value strategies and 
collaborated in different sectors. It developed a unified agenda and formed a common front 
to defend. The class struggle peaked, and the labour got organised via general strikes, rallies 
and protest movements. Firm neoliberal attack under the unique conditions of the 
economic crisis contributed to the class struggle by raising class consciousness and unifying 
different segments of labour.  
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